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Income Tax-Deductions-Loans by Employee to Corporation
Deductible as Business Bad Debts
Taxpayer, a corporate employee, was required to advance loans
to the corporation as a requisite for holding his job. These loans
subsequently became worthless, and the taxpayer deducted the
amount as a business bad debt. The Tax Court disallowed this
deduction on the grounds that it was a nonbusiness debt. Held,
reversed. Rendering services for pay is a trade or business within
the meaning of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166 (d) (2) (A).
Loans made in furtherance thereof are deductible as business bad
debts when they become worthless. Trent v. Commissioner, 291
F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961).
The dilemma involved in the determination of what constitutes
a "trade or business" has provided the courts with a prolonged flow
of litigation. The term appears repeatedly throughout the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, but the bulk of litigation stems from the
interpretation of §§ 162 (a), 166 (d) (2) (A), and 172 (d). If
an expense is an ordinary and necessary one incurred in carrying
on any trade or business, it is fully deductible under § 162 (a).
A nonbusiness debt is only partially deductible. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 166 (d) and 172 (d). The importance of having a worthless debt classifed under § 162 (a) is thus readily apparent.
Earlier litigation has concerned the employee- investor situations in which the courts were called upon to decide whether investments by corporate officers could be considered a "trade or
business" within the scope of the predecessor of § 172. In Dalton
v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404 (1932), the taxpayer was an inventor,
and the loss he sought to carry over under the predecessor of § 172
resulted from the worthlessness of the stock of one of several companies which he controlled. The Court disallowed this deduction,
stating that the taxpayer's trade or business was that of an inventor
and the amount expended for the stock was an investment. See
also Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410 (1932). The Dalton and Clark
decisions were followed in McGinn v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 680
(9th Cir. 1935), wherein the court ruled that losses incurred in
following a trade or business of being a corporate officer did not
result from the operation of a trade or business. This ruling does
not logically follow from the Dalton and Clark cases which did
not decide this issue, but rather decided that advances by an em-
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ployee to a corporation to protect his investment were not attributable to a trade or business.
Previous to Dalton v. Bowers, supra, and Burnet v. Clark,
supra, it had been held that where a taxpayer has three businesses
and suffers a loss in one, the other two are not considered a trade
or business for the purpose of reducing the net operating loss
under the predecessor of § 172. Hughes v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d
755 (10th Cir. 1930). The ruling in this case and also that in
McGinn v. Commissioner, supra, were held to be erroneous in
Folker v. Johnson, 230 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1956). In this case the
taxpayer had nonbusiness deductions, and asserted that his income
resulting from being a corporate officer and employee was not income from a trade or business. The court held that the taxpayer
was engaged in the trade or business of rendering services for pay.
The same result was also reached in Batzell v. Commissioner, 266
F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1959); Pierce v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 885
(9th Cir. 1958); Roberts v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 634 (5th Cir.
1958); Overly v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1957).
The rejection of Hughes v. Commissioner, supra, seems justified
since that case rested on a finding that the legislative intent behind
the relevant statute was solely to protect industries against postwar
deflation of inventory values. Comment, 70 HAv. L. Rav. 733
(1957).
The decisions of the employee-investor cases have lost much
of their effect due to the enactment of the 1954 Code which allows
all ordinary and necessary expenses related to property held for
the production of income to be deducted. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,

§ 212. However, the problem is still paramount in situations where
the taxpayer possesses no income-producing property, but has expenses related to his trade or business of being a salaried employee as in the principal' case.
The 1954 Code provides for specific expenses which may be
deducted from gross income if such expenses are attributable to
a trade or business other than rendering services by the taxpayer
as an employee. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 62 (1). This implies
that the performance of services by the taxpayer as an employee
is a trade or business for other purposes. This interpretation has
been applied to the term "trade or business" in § 172. See Folker
v. Johnson, 230 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1956); Anders Lagreide,
23 T.C. 508 (1954); Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th
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Cir. 1950). Where the purpose of the two statutory provisions
is similar, a consistent interpretation is desirable. The net operating
loss defined in § 172 is utilized in the statutory scheme by taking
a deduction as provided in § 166. Folker v. Johnson, supra. However, the various circuits have not placed a consistent interpretation upon the term "trade or business" even within this one section
of the Code. Some circuits have allowed a corporate officer to
deduct ordinary and necessary expenses incurred as a direct result
of being such an employee. See Hochschild v. Commissioner, 181
F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947), (expenses of corporate officer in defending suit arising out of his duties); Schmidlapp v. Commissioner,
96 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1938), (unreimbursed entertainment expenses); Commissioner v. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F.2d
187 (3d Cir. 1932), (legal expenses of board chairman in defending against charges of unlawful filing of tax returns). In all
of the above situations the taxpayer-officer was required to make
expenditures by his corporate employer. The principal case appears to fall within this same pattern. The taxpayer did not make
the advances to the corporation to protect his investment, as was
conceded by the Commissioner in the Tax Court. He likewise was
not engaged in other trades or businesses, which differentiates this
case from the earlier employee-investor cases.
The distinction about which the issue revolves appears to be
whether such loans or expenses were required by the corporate
employer as a necessary element of the taxpayer's employment.
This distinction was pointed out in Noland v. Commissioner, 269
F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1959). The court held that if an employee
voluntarily pays or guarantees the corporation's obligations, his
expenses may not be deducted on his personal return. The court
went on to say that there was not sufficient proof to support the
taxpayer's contention that the expenses he incurred were required
by his employer. This ruling strongly implies that where there is
adequate proof of the expenses being required of the taxpayer by
the corporation, they would be deductible under § 162 (a).
Diametrically opposed to this position is the holding in Wheeler
v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1957). The court ruled
that the only instance where a shareholder or officer may deduct
debts of his corporation is where his business can be considered to
be the "promoting and financing of business enterprises." This
was promulgated upon the decision in Henry E. Sage, 15 T.C. 299
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(1950), which held that a corporate officer's expenses are deductible if his business is promoting and investing in various corporations. However, the Tax Court did not say that this was the
only instance in which such expenses or debts were deductible.
The language in Wheeler is strong and direct, but was discounted
by the court in the principal case as being too broad. The Wheeler
case is supported by dictum in Commissioner v. Smith, 203 F.2d
310 (2d Cir. 1953).
The Tax Court in the principal case below relied upon Rollins
v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1960). The court stated
that activities of an individual as a stockholder, officer, and director
of a corporation in conducting the business of the corporation do
not amount to the carrying on of a personal trade or business by
the taxpayer. The taxpayer was a lawyer, and this was merely an
investment which could not be classified as his trade or business.
This employee-investor decision is not controlling upon the facts
in the principal case.
The holding that an employee who is required to make advances to his employer as a requisite to his employment may deduct them when they become worthless is equitable, and reasonably
interprets the legislative intent behind §§ 162 (a) and 166 (d). A
sole proprietor may deduct bad debts arising from his trade or
business, and it is unreasonable to assume that Congress would
penalize a taxpayer who incurred like expenses because he is not
fortunate enough to have his own business. The factual situation
which gave rise to this case is a rare one, but it appears that cases
arising under similar facts should follow this ruling.
David Mayer Katz

Income Tax-Embezzled Funds Represent Taxable Income
P embezzled 738,000 dollars during the years 1951-1954 and
failed to report these amounts as income. Despite a prior Supreme
Court ruling which held that embezzled funds are not taxable, P
was convicted of willful evasion of the federal income tax. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed. Embezzled funds
are included as income of the embezzler and subject to federal
income tax. P's conviction reversed on other grounds. James v.
United States, 81 S.Ct. 1052 (1961).
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